Israel must hurry to finish Gaza operation
The problem here is the daily casualty count—not Israel’s but Gaza’s. That kind of long-term action is not sustainable, because it’s a moral disaster.
A convoy of vehicles carrying World Central Kitchen aid workers was attacked by Israeli forces, killing seven, in what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called “a tragic case of our forces unintentionally hitting innocent people in the Gaza Strip.” The real tragedy is that this is a daily occurrence. After 180 days fighting in Gaza, it’s time for Israel to wrap things up.
I am an American sitting 10,000 kilometers away, so my opinion is just like anyone else’s who doesn’t live in the war zone. The fact is, Israel can do what it wants. The IDF’s advanced capabilities allow it to strike deep into Syria, taking out Iranian generals in Damascus. Iran vowed to respond, but it seems that response will be wearing tailored jackets and speaking into microphones. Perhaps “a few missiles that its militias will launch toward American bases in Iraq, and perhaps Saudi Arabia or even Jordan,” according to Mohammad Shazar, a Syrian dissident.
The aid convoy in Gaza was thought to have a Hamas fighter embedded in it, but the intelligence was wrong. That’s how the fog of war goes: some shirtless man approached IDF soldiers holding an Israeli flag, speaking Hebrew. He was shot dead. He was a hostage, not a terrorist.
“It happens in war, we are fully examining this,” said Netanyahu, “we are in contact with the governments and we will do everything so that this thing does not happen again.” Israel has been “doing everything” for six months. I have no doubt that IDF military lawyers, intelligence officers, and operational commanders care about avoiding innocent deaths. Even so, over 20,000 non-combatants are dead, and that’s using the best-case ratios the IDF presents on the number of actual fighters killed. That averages to 111 people a day. It’s inevitable that journalists, aid workers, and diplomats are going to get killed unintentionally. Making it worse is that Hamas does little to protect civilians and even uses them as cover for its fighters.
In this war, there’s a link between the diplomatic, public-relations and propaganda, and military operations. Of course it’s like that with all wars, but here, concepts like humiliation and shame take on Middle East meaning that westerners don’t see so well. The strike on Damascus was a humiliating message to Tehran that Israel is still prepared to do “crazy” if Hizbollah moves beyond a certain level of response. “Crazy” means Gaza all the way to Beirut. The strike also took out key planners who were working to make things harder for western allies in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aiden, and further disrupt shipping through the Suez.
Privately, all the Middle East governments talking to Jerusalem tell Israel to get on with it and finish what it’s doing in Gaza. That means going into Rafah, and exposing IDF troops to probably the harshest fighting they’ve seen, even including Khan Younis. Hamas has always had a place to evacuate to and regroup. Rafah is the last bastion, and it also includes the valuable cross-border tunnels into Egypt which bring goods and smuggling (meaning revenue due to the 20% “tax” Hamas charges for their use) into Gaza. Hamas is not going to let those tunnels be destroyed without exacting a toll in IDF lives and casualties.
So far, the IDF has spent a lot of time and effort keeping its own casualties low. According to published IDF figures, since the beginning of the war, a total of 3,186 soldiers have been wounded; 1,553 since the beginning of ground operations. About half the wounds have been categorized as “mild,” another third as “moderate” and about 20% “severe.” Since the start of ground operations, 256 IDF soldiers have been killed.
The IDF says it has “dismantled” 20 of the original 24 Hamas battalions, meaning they are no longer combat effective as a unit, but still able to fight in some capacity. Depending on what report you believe, the operation has killed between 9-12,000 Hamas “operatives,” including nearly 100 senior commanders. That means Israel is taking casualties at a rate under 3% of what it inflicts. Part of the strategy to keep losses low is having only necessary combat troops in Gaza—Israel has pulled out 60% of its original combat divisions. Going into Rafah will necessitate some kind of “surge,” along with other operations, like the recent assault on al Shifah hospital, handling “clean-up.”
This is the “third phase” of the war, when Israel expects to gain the most permanent value from its operation. It is also planned as the longest phase, focusing on a “sustainable” war to keep Hamas from re-emerging. The problem here is the daily casualty count—not Israel’s but Gaza’s. That kind of long-term action is not sustainable, because it’s a moral disaster.
Israel needs to think of the diplomatic, reputational, and economic damage a long-term (meaning another six months or longer) phase of the Gaza war will inflict upon itself. President Joe Biden has already rejected the “third phase” plan, and he showed it by betraying Israel to its haters in the U.N. Where the U.S. leads, won’t take much work for the rest of the western world to follow.
Even Donald Trump has expressed some uncomfortable truths, speaking to hard-line right-wing Israeli journalists. Jonathan Swan, writing in the New York Times, used this to give cover to Biden’s actions toward Israel.
“You have to finish up your war,” Mr. Trump said. “You have to get it done. We have to get to peace. We can’t have this going on.”
Trump isn’t wrong. He, along with most Israelis (after their initial shock and numbness), criticized Netanyahu’s handling of intelligence in the wake of October 7th. Swan called Trump’s remarks “hedging.”
It’s not hedging to tell the truth about how badly this war is damaging Israel’s international image. It’s not hedging to say that the repercussions of this war going on for months longer could harm Israeli economic, security, and intelligence efforts for many years. It’s not hedging to say that this entire problem occurred on Netanyahu’s watch, and he is uniquely responsible for the intelligence disaster and policy toward Gaza that allowed October 7th to happen.
It’s not hedging to say that Netanyahu better get on with it and “finish up” as quickly as possible, or take one of the many offramps that may get the hostages home (sadly, not anymore). The problem not is not that Trump (with whom I almost never agree, but I do this time) told some reporters a few uncomfortable truths about how the war is perceived by the non-Israeli public. The problem is that Joe Biden, the sitting president, blindsided Israel and Netanyahu by siding with the anti-Israel U.N., making a deal with China and Russia to force some kind of “peace” (meaning a unilateral ceasefire), giving Hamas exactly the ammunition it wanted to get Israel to stop its war before all the tunnels and weapons have been destroyed.
The window for the Gaza war is closing, not because Israel could not stay in Gaza for the foreseeable future, but because the cost for doing that will become unacceptable to Israelis, who value having a country—a democratic country with liberal values—they can be proud of.
Netanyahu would be well served by advice to get on with it and move on Rafah. It might result in a higher number of IDF casualties. It might result in the deaths of over 100 remaining hostages. But not moving quickly could result in a half-done, therefore a failed, operation that’s gone on for 180 days. Each day that headlines like the World Central Kitchen deaths pop up makes that result more probable.
Now is the time to hurry and get out of Gaza. Then let the rebuilding begin, however that is going to look.
Related: Benny Gantz has called for early elections in September.
Not a good look:
"During the early stages of the war, the army gave sweeping approval for officers to adopt Lavender’s kill lists, with no requirement to thoroughly check why the machine made those choices or to examine the raw intelligence data on which they were based. One source stated that human personnel often served only as a 'rubber stamp' for the machine’s decisions, adding that, normally, they would personally devote only about '20 seconds' to each target before authorizing a bombing — just to make sure the Lavender-marked target is male. This was despite knowing that the system makes what are regarded as 'errors' in approximately 10 percent of cases, and is known to occasionally mark individuals who have merely a loose connection to militant groups, or no connection at all."
https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/