There was a loss of innocence with the Challenger disaster. All of New Hampshire was watching. People back then went out of their way to watch shuttle launches. Sure it was dangerous, but we all innocently believed that the launches and missions would be successful. I watched Challenger from a television at work with several coworkers. It was shocking to watch Challenger fall in pieces.Thanks Steve for reminding us all with your post.
The root cause of that O-ring failure was attributed to group think. Group think became the focus of millions of manhours of management and technical training -especially in areas such as engineering and nuclear power operations. I suspect it got a lot of attention in aviation also.
Good read. It reminded me of a corollary line of management training during the same time frame. "Twelve Angry Men", a film that illustrated sticking with your argument until your doubts and concerns are resolved to avoid mistakes like the Challenger disaster. I must have seen that black and white movie at least a dozen times.
Appreciate the article Steve, (and your previous one about the upcoming Artemis II mission as well).
You have it right Curtis that 'group think' was at the root of the O-ring failure. You likely know that Nobel Laureate physicist Richard Feynman reluctantly agreed to serve on the Rogers commission that investigated the disaster. (Feynman's inclusion on the commission was at the request of acting director of NASA, William Graham, who was a former student of Feynman at Caltech).
Feynman conducted an impromptu demonstration in front of the commission (and in front of TV cameras) by dunking a piece of O-ring material in ice water to show how it loses all its elasticity (and ability to create a tight seal) when frozen.
The commission's final report on the disaster required the signatures of all commission members. Feynman only agreed to sign the report if they agreed to add 20 some pages of his own conclusions to the report, which went in as Appendix F titled "Personal Observations on the Reliability of the Shuttle". Among other observations included In that appendix Feynman made a simple but important statement: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over pubic relations, for nature cannot be fooled".
Feynman was not beholden to NASA or any special interests and together with his understanding of science he helped bring out the truth regarding the O-ring.
Here's a relatively short article about the disaster:
I still remember watching that live on TV and was unsure about what I saw and if it was normal. It didn’t take long and I knew it was tragic. I was 9 years old at the time.
There was a loss of innocence with the Challenger disaster. All of New Hampshire was watching. People back then went out of their way to watch shuttle launches. Sure it was dangerous, but we all innocently believed that the launches and missions would be successful. I watched Challenger from a television at work with several coworkers. It was shocking to watch Challenger fall in pieces.Thanks Steve for reminding us all with your post.
The root cause of that O-ring failure was attributed to group think. Group think became the focus of millions of manhours of management and technical training -especially in areas such as engineering and nuclear power operations. I suspect it got a lot of attention in aviation also.
There's a paper on this from The Journal of Business Ethics:
https://www.pismin.com/10.2307/25071892
Good read. It reminded me of a corollary line of management training during the same time frame. "Twelve Angry Men", a film that illustrated sticking with your argument until your doubts and concerns are resolved to avoid mistakes like the Challenger disaster. I must have seen that black and white movie at least a dozen times.
Appreciate the article Steve, (and your previous one about the upcoming Artemis II mission as well).
You have it right Curtis that 'group think' was at the root of the O-ring failure. You likely know that Nobel Laureate physicist Richard Feynman reluctantly agreed to serve on the Rogers commission that investigated the disaster. (Feynman's inclusion on the commission was at the request of acting director of NASA, William Graham, who was a former student of Feynman at Caltech).
Feynman conducted an impromptu demonstration in front of the commission (and in front of TV cameras) by dunking a piece of O-ring material in ice water to show how it loses all its elasticity (and ability to create a tight seal) when frozen.
The commission's final report on the disaster required the signatures of all commission members. Feynman only agreed to sign the report if they agreed to add 20 some pages of his own conclusions to the report, which went in as Appendix F titled "Personal Observations on the Reliability of the Shuttle". Among other observations included In that appendix Feynman made a simple but important statement: "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over pubic relations, for nature cannot be fooled".
Feynman was not beholden to NASA or any special interests and together with his understanding of science he helped bring out the truth regarding the O-ring.
Here's a relatively short article about the disaster:
https://www.aps.org/archives/publications/apsnews/200101/history.cfm
I still remember watching that live on TV and was unsure about what I saw and if it was normal. It didn’t take long and I knew it was tragic. I was 9 years old at the time.